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NOTES
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board: The
Need for Judicial Restraint in Foreign
Commerce Clause Analysis
I. Introduction
It is an oft-repeated legal maxim that hard cases make bad law. To
this statement it should be added that good results in hard cases still
make bad law. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board' illustrates this
principle perfectly. Despite strenuous arguments to the contrary, 2 the
Court in Barclays held that California's method of taxing the income of
domestic and foreign-based "unitary" businesses3 violated neither the
Due Process nor the Commerce Clause. 4 While the Supreme Court
wisely refused to overturn the California tax,5 their reasoning suc-
ceeding in muddying the waters of dormant foreign Commerce Clause
analysis.
California uses a unitary taxation method called the "worldwide
combined reporting ' 6 (WWCR) method to tax unitary businesses and
corporations. 7 Using this method, a state applies an "apportionment
formula" to all the income of the unitary business, including its foreign
1 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994) [hereinafter Barclays]. Due to the potential impact of this
case, reporters from the Financial Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Guardian, and the
London Observer attended oral arguments. Final Verdict by June; Barclays Argues Tax Case
Before U.S. Supreme Court, THoMsoN's INT'L BANKING REGULATOR, Apr. 4, 1994, at 1 [hereinaf-
ter Final Verdict by June]. There was even "a BBC television crew ... waiting outside on the
marble steps of the court building ... [to interview] various interested observers who had
flown in for the [oral arguments]." Id. These observers were British trade and government
officials. Id.
2 These arguments were presented in numerous amicus briefs. Australia, Austria, Can-
ada, the European Community, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom all filed amicus briefs. Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2283 n.22.
3 A business is unitary if "the operation of the portion of the business done within [a]
state is dependent upon or contributes to the operation of the business [outside the] state."
Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 183 P.2d 16, 21 (Cal. 1947).
4 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2272.
5 For a discussion of the harm that would have resulted from the Court's rejection of
the tax, see infra note 187 and accompanying text.
6 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. 2268.
7 Unitary' taxation is essentially a formula-apportionment method of taxing unitary
businesses. Id. It "involves taxing a slice of a multinational[ ] [corporation's business] prof-
its; the size of the slice is calculated according to a simple formula based on how much of the
multinational's worldwide workforce, assets and sales are located within [a] state." Unhappy
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members.8 The formula is then used to calculate the approximate
amount of income attributable to the in-state activities of the unitary
business.9
WWCR taxation remains the target of much criticism throughout
the world. 10 Indeed, some nations, incensed by California's taxation
method, took retaliatory measures in an unsuccessful effort to end it.
Japan, for instance, threatened to pull out investment in states that
used the unitary taxation method,' while the United Kingdom en-
acted tax legislation detrimental to U.S. corporations conducting busi-
ness in Great Britain. 12
Two recent American presidents were concerned enough about
the foreign implications of state unitary taxation to take action. 13 In
1985, President Ronald Reagan agreed to support legislation banning
states from using unitary taxation to tax foreign corporations con-
ducting business within a state's borders. 14 Following Reagan's lead,
President George Bush condemned the use of unitary taxation by
states. 15 Meanwhile, Congress consistently failed to pass laws limiting
unitary taxation at the state level. 16 Despite all the controversy, Cali-
fornia persisted in using its WWCR method of taxation. The Barclays
case was the natural result of that persistence.
This Note explains the reasoning for the Court's holding in Bar-
clays in Part II. Part III of this Note compares the Barclays case with the
prior law in the area. Finally, Part IV analyzes the effects and implica-
tions of the Barclays decision, and offers some suggestions for clarifying
foreign Commerce Clause review.
returns for Barclays, THE ECONOMIST, June 25, 1994, at 79. Its aim is to tax that income that the
corporation earned within the taxing state.
8 Paul J. Hartman, Constitutional Limitations on State Taxation of Corporate Income ftom
Multinational Corporations, 37 VAND. L. REV. 217, 218 n.4 (1984).
9 David Hudson & Daniel C. Turner, International and Interstate Approaches to Taxing
Business Income, 6 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 562, 606 n.277 (1984).
10 See Final Verdict by June, supra note 1, at I (noting that many national governments,
including the U.S. government, are critical of California's taxation method); Japanese Applaud
Unitaiy Tax Vote; Many Say Ending System Will Boost Investment in State, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28,
1986, sec. IV, at 2 (noting that Britain andJapan believe California's tax system to be unfair);
see also Jonathan Schwarz, Survey of World Taxation, FIN. TIMES, May 20, 1994, at III (stating
that the Bush administration was opposed to states using unitary taxation methods); European
Commission Report Says Some Tax Laws Threaten Access to US. Markets, Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily
(BNA) (May 6, 1994), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (reporting that the Euro-
pean Commission believes American states which use unitary taxation methods impair Euro-
pean access to U.S. markets).
II Japanese May Not Invest in Unitary Tax States, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1983, at 6.
12 Reagan Agrees to Bill Banning Unitary Taxation, AusTRALLAN FIN. REV., Nov. 11, 1985, at
2.
13 However, one American Chief Executive, Bill Clinton, supports California's unitary
tax. Schwarz, supra note 10, at III.
14 Reagan Agrees to Bill Banning Unitary Taxation, supra note 12, at 2.
15 Schwarz, supra note 10, at III.
16 See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
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II. Statement of the Case
A. Factual Background
Barclays was really two cases, not one. In the first case, there were
two petitioners, Barclays Bank of California (Barcal) and Barclays Bank
International Limited (BBI).17 Both of these corporations were mem-
bers of the Barclays Group, a multinational banking enterprise based
in the United Kingdom including "more than 220 corporations doing
business in some 60 nations."18 Barcal and BBI conducted business in
California.19 Barcal, a subsidiary of BBI, was a California banking cor-
poration. 20 BBI, a British banking corporation, conducted business in
California, the United Kingdom, and thirty-three other nations. 21
The controversy in the case centered around the California
franchise tax returns of Barcal and BBI for 1977. When Barcal filed its
tax returns in California for that year, it only reported income from its
own operations; it did not report the income of its parent corporation
(i.e., BBI), nor did it report the income of the other members of the
Barclays Group.22 BBI did include the income of itself and its subsidi-
aries in its California tax return for 1977, including Barcal. However, it
reported neither the income of its parent (i.e., the Barclays Group)
nor the income of the Barclays Group's subsidiaries. 23 After reviewing
both Barcal's and BBI's tax returns, the California Franchise Tax
Board determined that both were members of a unitary business-the
Barclays Group-and that the entire income of the unitary business
had to be reported on both the Barcal and BBI returns. 24 The Tax
Board then applied California's three-factor WWCR method to the tax-
payers' returns and assessed additional taxes of $1,678 on BBI and
$152,420 on Barcal.25 Both taxpayers paid "the assessments and sued
for refunds."26
The petitioner in the second case was Colgate-Palmolive Co. (Col-
gate), a Delaware corporation with its headquarters in New York.27
Colgate and its domestic subsidiaries manufacture and distribute
household and personal hygiene products. 28 Colgate also owns sev-
enty-five foreign subsidiaries which engage in the same line of
business.29
17 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2274 (1994).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 See id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 2275.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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The dispute in the Colgate litigation focused on Colgate's Califor-
nia franchise tax returns for 1970-73. 30 Unlike BBI and Barcal, Col-
gate did in fact report the income of all the members of its unitary
enterprise on its tax returns. However, Colgate reported the income
from its foreign subsidiaries using an Arm's Length/Separate Account-
ing Method (AL/SA) .31 Colgate argued that the Constitution forced
"California to limit the reach of its unitary [taxation method] to the
United States' water's edge."32 The California Franchise Tax Board
did not agree with Colgate's argument and ruled that Colgate's taxes
should be calculated by using the WWCR method.33 Using this
method, the Tax Board assessed additional taxes of $604,765 on Col-
gate for the years in question. 34 After Colgate paid the taxes, it sued in
the California courts for a refund. 35
B. The Litigation in the California Courts
1. The Barclays Litigation
BBI and Barcal (Barclays) brought suit in a California Superior
Court charging that the WWCR method violated the foreign Com-
merce Clause 36 of the U.S. Constitution.3 7 The Superior Court ruled
in favor of Barclays, and a California appellate court affirmed the rul-
ing, holding that WWCR taxation was "unconstitutional as applied to
foreign-based unitary groups."38
On appeal, the California Supreme Court overturned the appel-
late court's ruling. Relying on prior precedents,3 9 the court held that
WWCR taxation withstood scrutiny under foreign Commerce Clause
analysis. 40 It then remanded the case to a California appellate court
for a determination of whether the WWCR method violated either the
Due Process Clause or the anti-discrimination component of the inter-
30 Id.
31 Id. When a state uses an Arm's Length/Separate Accounting (AL/SA) taxation
method "the corporation's operations within the taxing State are regarded as though sepa-
rate and distinct" from the other branches of the corporation. PAUL J. HARTMAN, FEDERAL
LIMITATIONS ON STATE & LocAL TAXATION § 9:17 (1981). The income of the in-state business
"is determined without reference to the success or failure of the taxpayer's operations in
other States." Id.
32 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2275. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
33 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2275.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations
.... "U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
37 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 829 P.2d 279, 280 (Cal. 1992) [hereinafter
Barclays I].
38 Id. at 280-81 (emphasis added).
39 See infra notes 128-42, 175-84 and accompanying text for a discussion ofJapan Line,
Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434 (1979), and Wardair Can. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue,
477 U.S. 1 (1986).
40 Barclays I, supra note 37, 829 P.2d at 300.
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state Commerce Clause. 41 On remand, the appellate court ruled that
the tax as applied neither discriminated nor violated the Due Process
Clause. 42
2. The Colgate Litigation
The problem facing Colgate was somewhat different than that fac-
ing Barclays. Essentially, the issue in the Colgate litigation was whether
California's WWCR method as applied to a domestic-based unitary
group violated the foreign Commerce Clause. Basing its ruling on
prior case law (including one case directly on point), the California
appellate court held that the WWCR method did not violate the Com-
merce Clause. 43 The court reasoned that even under the dormant for-
eign Commerce Clause-which prohibits certain state actions whether
or not Congress has acted-California's tax was legal.4 4
On appeal, the California Supreme Court vacated the decision of
the Court of Appeals, and remanded it with instructions to reconsider
the decision in light of the California Supreme Court's ruling in Bar-
clays L45 On remand, the Court of Appeals decided that a dormant
Commerce Clause analysis did not apply.46 Instead, the court held
that Congress had acted, thereby acquiescing in the WWCR method of
taxation.4 7 In short, the tax did not violate the foreign Commerce
Clause.48
C. The Case Before the U.S. Supreme Court
The Supreme Court consolidated both Colgate's and Barclays'
claims for purposes of their decision. In the opinion, written by Justice
Ginsburg, the Court divided its legal analysis into three parts. 49 The
41 Id.
42 Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 539 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) [hereinafter Barclays II].
43 Colgate-Palmolive v. Franchise Tax Bd., 284 Cal. Rptr. 780, 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
[hereinafter Colgate I].
In Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 169 (1983), the U.S. Supreme
Court had previously upheld California's tax as applied to domestic-based unitary businesses.
See infra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
44 Colgate I, supra note 43, 284 Cal. Rptr. at 790-800.
45 In Barclays I, the California Supreme Court, following the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Wardair, held that when Congress has acted there is no need to resort to dormant
Commerce Clause analysis. Barclays I, supra note 37, 829 P.2d 279, 294 (Cal. 1992) (citing
Wardair Can. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9 (1986)). Moreover, certain types of
congressional "silence," such as affirmative refusal to pass laws, constitutes congressional ac-
tion precluding resort to dormant Commerce Clause analysis. Id. at 291.
46 Colgate-Palmolive v. Franchise Tax Bd., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761, 770-71 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) [hereinafter Colgate I1].
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Justice Ginsburg was joined in the opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Blackmun, Stevens, Kennedy, and Souter. Justice Scaliajoined all but part IV-B of the opin-
ion, which addressed whether "federal uniformity" would be impaired by the tax. See infra
notes 72-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of part IV-B of the Court's opinion. In
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first part analyzed the dormant interstate Commerce Clause as it ap-
plied to the claims of Barclays and Colgate.50 The second part of the
analysis addressed the petitioners Due Process claims, 51 and the final
section dealt with the dormant foreign Commerce Clause. 52
The Court's legal analysis began with a review of the Commerce
Clause. Justice Ginsberg first noted that the dormant Commerce
Clause, which prohibits certain state actions relating to commerce
even in the absence of congressional action, is a well-established rule.53
Next, the Court discussed the two components of the dormant Com-
merce Clause: the dormant interstate Commerce Clause and the dor-
mant foreign Commerce Clause. 54 The opinion noted that the
dormant interstate Commerce Clause prohibits state taxation schemes
which: (1) tax activities "lacking a substantial nexus to the taxing
state"; (2) apportion income unfairly; (3) "discriminate[ ] against in-
terstate commerce"; or (4) are not "fairly related to the services pro-
vided by the state." 55
Relying on prior precedents, the Supreme Court, like the Califor-
nia courts, 56 stated that the dormant foreign Commerce Clause incor-
porates these four elements, and adds two additional requirements.
The first of these new requirements outlaws state taxation methods
which create an "enhanced risk of multiple taxation,"57 and the second
requirement mandates that the scheme not interfere "with the Federal
Government's capacity to 'speak with one voice when regulating [for-
eign] commercial relations.' "58
The Court then addressed whether California's WWCR method
failed any of the four tests of the interstate Commerce Clause. It held
that there was no such violation. The Court reached this conclusion
without much difficulty, except with respect to the possibility that
addition, Justices Blackmun and Souter filed separate concurrences, while Justice O'Connor
wrote a dissent in whichJustice Thomasjoined. Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2268
(1994).
50 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2276-78. See infra notes 53-61 and accompanying
text.
51 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2278-79. See infra notes 62-68 and accompanying
text.
52 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2279-86. See infra notes 69-79 and accompanying
text.
53 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2276. See generally JOHN E. NowAx, RONALD RO-
TUNDA & S. NELSON YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 8.1-8.6 (3d ed. 1986) (tracing the devel-
opment of the dormant Commerce Clause and describing types of state actions affected by
the clause).
54 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2276.
55 Id. (citing Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
56 See Barclays I, supra note 37, 829 P.2d 279, 287 (Cal. 1992); Colgate II, supra note 46,
13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761, 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
57 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2276 (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 169, 185 (1983)).
58 Id. (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (quoting
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976))).
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WWCR taxation might discriminate against foreign commerce.59 On
this point Barclays made the same argument before the Court that it
made in the California courts: complying with WWCR's reporting re-
quirements placed a greater burden on foreign companies than on
domestic companies. 60 The Court dismissed this argument, pointing
to California regulations which allowed "reasonable approximations"
of a corporation's income to be made if it was too costly or expensive
to assemble certain records. 61
Having made this ruling, the Court was forced to address whether
the California regulation allowing the use of reasonable approxima-
tions of a corporation's income 62 violated Due Process.63 Barclays ar-
gued that this regulation unconstitutionally granted the California
Franchise Tax Board unlimited discretion to determine what "approxi-
mations" of a corporation's income would be accepted.64 Barclays' ar-
gument failed. In support of its holding the Court argued that: (1)
"reasonableness" was an effective guide in judicial review;65 (2) the Cal-
ifornia courts had narrowly construed the law to limit the Tax Board's
discretion; 66 (3) taxpayers have the ability to clarify their tax burden
through an "advance determination";67 and (4) rules governing mul-
tijurisdictional taxes were generally imprecise. 68
In the last section of its opinion, the Court addressed the two spe-
cific requirements of the dormant foreign Commerce Clause. Initially,
the opinion dealt with the mandate that a state taxing scheme avoid
creating an enhanced risk of multiple taxation. The Court admitted
that foreign-based multinational corporations face a high risk of multi-
ple taxation, as they often have operations in jurisdictions with lower
wage rates and property values than in American states.69 Moreover,
59 Id. at 2276-78.
60 Id. at 2277. Barclays contended that this burden resulted from the prohibitive costs it
had to incur as a result of converting "its diverse financial and accounting records from
around the world into the language, currency, and accounting principles of the United
States." Id.
61 Id. at 2278 (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 25137-6(e)(1) (1985)).
62 See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
63 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2278.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. For example, the California Court of Appeals had read the regulations to require
that the Board consider the effort and expense required for a corporation to assemble
records before the Board could even decide to apply the reasonable approximations stan-
dard. See Barclays II, supra note 42, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 537, 541 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
67 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2279 (quoting CAL. CODE REGs., tit. 18, § 25137-
6(e) (2) (1985)). These advance determinations would help the taxpayer determine the tax
effects of his actions. Id. See also infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
68 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2279.
69 Id. at 2279-80. Justice Powell's dissent in Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax
Bd. does an excellent job of pointing out this problem. 463 U.S. 159, 198-201 (1982) (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting). In Container Corp., 27% of the taxpayer's income was earned and taxed in
Latin America under the AL/SA method. Id. at 200 (Powell, J., dissenting). However, the
taxpayer only had 6% of its worldwide wage base in Latin America, 20% of its property in that
19951
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the Court had to address the difficult fact that the trial court had
found multiple taxation to exist in this case, at least in relation to Bar-
clays. 70 Unphased by this finding, the Court simply stated that this
multiple taxation was not the "inevitable result" of California's WWCR
taxation, and that the alternative to WWCR taxation (i.e., AL/SA taxa-
tion) would not eliminate the risk of multiple taxation. 71 Thus, Cali-
fornia's taxation scheme did not fail on this count.
Finally, the majority addressed the last prong of the dormant
Commerce Clause analysis. Prior to this point the Court's analysis had
applied with equal force to both Barclays' and Colgate's claims. How-
ever, facing the question of whether WWCR taxation impaired federal
uniformity in an area where it was essential, or whether it prevented
the federal government from speaking with one voice, the Court de-
cided to address Barclays' and Colgate's claims separately. Quickly dis-
missing Colgate's claim in this area, the Court noted that Container
Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board72 had "held that California's
[WWCR] requirement, as applied to domestic corporations with for-
eign subsidiaries, did not violate the 'one voice' standard." 73
However, Barclays' claim was not identical to that of Container
Corp. As a result, a more in-depth analysis was required with respect to
their claim. At the outset, the Court stated that the lessons of Container
Corp. and Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue74 were
simply that:
Congress-may more passively indicate that certain state practices do
not "impair federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is
essential[;]" it need not convey its intent with the unmistakable clarity
required to permit state regulation that discriminates against inter-
state commerce or otherwise falls short under Complete Auto
inspection.
75
region, and 14% of its sales in Latin America. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Thus, under
Worldwide Combined Reporting (WWCR) only 13% of its worldwide income was attributed
to Latin America. Id. (Powell,J., dissenting). The amount of income attributed to ajurisdic-
tion under WWCR taxation is calculated by averaging the wages, property, and sales of a
corporation within a jurisdiction. See id. (Powell, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of
how this method operates, see infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. This model shows
the high likelihood that the income earned in Latin America would be taxed again in a
jurisdiction, like California, that used WWCR taxation since that method can (at least theo-
retically) under-value the income earned in low-wage and low-propertyjurisdictions. See also
JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION: I CORPORATE INCOME AND FRANCHISE TAXES
8.10[51-[6] (1983) (outlining double taxation argument against WWCR taxation).
70 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2288 (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
71 Id. at 2280-81.
72 463 U.S. 169 (1983).
73 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2281. See infra notes 162-74 and accompanying
text.
74 477 U.S. 1 (1986). See infta notes 175-84 and accompanying text.
75 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2282-83 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of
L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)) (internal citations omitted). Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), was a case dealing with a Mississippi tax on a business engaged in
interstate commerce. Using dormant interstate Commerce Clause review, the Court set forth
[VOL. 20
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Here, the Court found such passive indications through repeated con-
gressional refusal to enact treaties or laws prohibiting WWCR. 76 The
Court then ruled that given such indications, it would not overturn the
tax on grounds that it impaired foreign policy as decisions on these
grounds were best left to the federal executive and legislative branches.
The Court also made short work of the argument that executive
statements critical of WWCR could act as "the one voice" of the federal
government prohibiting such taxes. The majority simply stated that
the Commerce Clause gives power to regulate Commerce to Congress
not the President. 77 . Therefore, the executive statements could not act
as the "one voice."7 8 Having completed its analysis, the Court upheld
California's WWCR taxation method as applied to both domestic and
foreign-based corporations. 79
Both Justices Blackmun and Scalia filed concurring opinions in
the case. Justice Blackmun concurred in the entirety of the majority
opinion but expressed reservations about using congressional inaction
to infer approval of WWCR taxation.8 0 Justice Scalia too had con-
curred in the majority opinion, but did notjoin the Court's opinion on
the "federal uniformity" and "one voice" tests.8 1 Instead, he used his
concurrence to state that he would enforce a negative or dormant
Commerce Clause in only two instances: (1) "against a state law that
facially discriminates against [interstate or foreign] commerce"; 82 and
(2) "against a state law that is indistinguishable from a type of law pre-
viously held unconstitutional by this Court."8 3
Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred in the
judgment in part and dissented in part. With regards to Colgate's
the four requirements that a state tax dealing with interstate commerce has to meet in order
to be valid.
[D] ecisions [of the Court] have sustained a tax against Commerce Clause chal-
lenge when the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate com-
merce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.
Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279. For a discussion of how these requirements applied to the
Barclays decision, see supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
76 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2283-84. See infra notes 99-107 and accompanying
text.
77 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2285.
78 Id. However, the Court explicitly refused to rule on the question of whether execu-
tive action could preempt state laws dealing with commerce "in the absence of either a con-
gressional grant or denial of authority." Id. at 2286.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 2286-87 (Blackmun,J., concurring).
81 Id. at 2287 (Scalia,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
82 Id. (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Itel Con-
tainers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 113 S. Ct. 1095, 1106-07 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment)).
83 Id. (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Itel Con-
tainers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 113 S. Ct. 1095, 1106-07 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment)).
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claim, the dissent agreed with the Court that it should fail. 84 However,
the dissent simply believed that the decision to uphold WWCR taxation
in Container Corp. should control the result in Colgate's case, as both
cases involved the application of WWCR to domestic-based unitary
businesses. 85
However, Justice O'Connor opined that WWCR taxation could
not survive a constitutional challenge made by a foreign-based corpora-
tion.8 6 In her view, WWCR taxation simply created too great a risk of
multiple taxation. The dissent believed this risk was a consequence of
the inconsistency of California's tax scheme relative to the taxation
method adopted by most foreign nations (i.e., AL/SA taxation) and
the fact that foreign nations would usually have lower wage rates and
property values than California.8 7
Ill. Background Law
A. Statutory Law
1. California Law
When Barclays and Colgate were originally subject to California's
WWCR taxation method, they had no options as the tax was
mandatory.8 8 The tax used a three-factor formula based on property,
payroll, and sales.8 9 Under the WWCR method, a unitary business was
taxed on a percentage of its worldwide income equaling the average
percentage of the business' property, payroll, and sales located in Cali-
fornia.90 For example, if a unitary business has eleven percent of its
payroll in California, three percent of property in the state, and made
ten percent of its sales in the state, it would be taxed on eight percent
of its worldwide income since that represents the average of its busi-
ness' payroll, property, and sales. Thus, if that business had worldwide
income of $9,000,000, California would levy a $720,000 tax (i.e., eight
percent of its worldwide income).
California had also promulgated regulations implementing sec-
tion 25128 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code.9 1 These reg-
84 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part).
85 Id. (O'Connor, J. dissenting in part).
86 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
87 Id. at 2288-90 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
88 "[Afl] business income shall be apportioned to this state by multiplying the income
by a fraction, the numerator of which is the property factor plus the payroll factor plus the
sales factor, and the denominator of which is three." CAL. REv. & TAX. ConE § 25128 (West
1992).
California has since amended its tax laws to allow a corporate taxpayer to limit its in-
come to that which is derived from its U.S. operations. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25110 (West
1992). This is known as the "water's edge" method. See infra note 185 and accompanying
text.
89 CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 25128.
90 Id.
91 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 25137-6 (1993).
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ulations contained extensive reporting requirements. A unitary
business was required to file a profit and loss statement for each for-
eign corporation within the unitary business, in order to enable the
Franchise Tax Board to compute the unitary business' tax.9 2 More-
over, adjustments had to be made to those profit and loss statements so
that it would conform "to the accounting principles generally accepted
in the United States."93 In lieu of preparing a profit and loss statement
for each foreign corporation within the unitary business, a "consoli-
dated profit and loss statement prepared for the related corporations
of which the unitary business is a member which is prepared for filing
with the Securities and Exchange Commission" could be submitted to
the Franchise Tax Board.94
Undoubtedly, these provisions would have a great impact on a
unitary business with numerous foreign subsidiaries. Other provisions
within the regulations, however, softened the blow. For instance, the
regulations required that the Franchise Tax Board "consider the effort
and expense required to obtain the necessary information."95 In cases
where the "necessary data cannot be developed from financial records
maintained in the regular course of business [the Board] may accept
reasonable approximations" of a unitary business' income.96 A tax-
payer could also request an advanced determination of the effect of
certain actions he might take.97 Additionally, "[flailure to request or
to obtain a favorable advance determination" would not preclude re-
consideration of those same issues at a later date.98
2. U.S. Congressional Action
The Supreme Court was correct when it found that Congress had
repeatedly refused to enact legislation prohibiting WWCR taxation.
On numerous occasions Congress considered bills which would have
prohibited states from using the WWCR method to tax the foreign
members of a unitary business if those members earned a "substantial"
amount of their income from outside the United States.99 However,
none of the bills passed. On other occasions, Congress failed to pass
bills which would have prohibited states from forcing taxpayers to re-
port any income not subject to federal income tax. 100 These bills
would have generally kept the income of foreign-based members of
92 Id. § 25137-6(b)(1)(A).
93 Id. § 25137-6(b) (1) (B).
94 Id. § 25137-6(b) (2).
95 Id. § 25137-6(e)(1).
96 Id.
97 Id. § 25137-6(e) (2).
98 Id.
99 See, e.g., S. 1245, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 2173, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978);
H.R. 6146, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
100 See, e.g., H.R. 11,798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. 5076, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979); S. 1225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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unitary groups from being aggregated with the income of the unitary
group.10 1 However, these too failed to pass.
President Ronald Reagan, at the height of his popularity, also in-
troduced legislation which attempted to outlaw states from using the
income of foreign-based members of a unitary business to compute the
income of that business. 10 2 However, Reagan and supporters of the
proposal withdrew support for the bill after California moved to curtail
WWCR taxation.103
Barclays' claim was also impacted by the Convention for Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Re-
spect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains.104 This particular
convention was an agreement between the United Kingdom and the
United States. In its original form, the treaty explicitly prohibited sub-
national units such as states and municipalities from "tak[ing] into ac-
count" the income of a non-domestic member of a unitary business
when it was computing the taxable income of the unitary business. 10 5
The version of the treaty that included this provision failed to pass.10 6
Eventually, the treaty was ratified subject to the reservation that states
would not be explicitly prohibited by the treaty from taking into ac-
count the income of non-domestic members of a unitarygroup when it
was computing the taxable income of that group.10 7
B. Case Law
1. Early Precedents
The Supreme Court first addressed a formula-apportionment
method of taxation similar to WWCR in Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain.108 In that case, the Court was faced with the constitution-
ality of Connecticut's method of taxing "manufacturing and trading
companies."109 In Connecticut, such companies were taxed on two
101 Generally, the federal taxation scheme relies on an AL/SA method. Lewis B. Kaden,
State Taxation of Multinational Corporations, 32 CATH. U. L. REv. 829, 831 (1983). Thus, a
foreign member of a unitary group is presumed to be a separate entity, and its income is
simply not taken into account. United States Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 617 F.2d 942, 947
(2d Cir. 1980). However, under 26 U.S.C. § 482 (1988), the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue can allocate income from a subsidiary to a parent group if it can be shown that the
parent "has complete power to shift income among its subsidiaries, and has [in fact] exer-
cised that power." Procter and Gamble Co. v. Commissioner, 961 F.2d 1255, 1259 (6th Cir.
1992).
102 Reagan Agrees to Bill Banning Unitary Taxation, supra note 12, at 2.
103 Federal Unitary Tax Legislation Loses Support During Senate Finance Panel Hearing, 3 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1207 (Oct. 1, 1986).
104 Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, Dec. 31, 1975, U.S.-U.K., 31 U.S.T. 5670.
105 Id. at art. 9(4).
106 124 CONG. REc. 18,670 (1978).
107 Proclamation on the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, Apr. 9,
1980, U.S.-U.K., 31 U.S.T. 5668.
108 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
109 Id. at 117.
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percent of their annual income earned in the state. °10 The state calcu-
lated such income using a formula-apportionment method. If the tax-
payer derived its net profits "principally from ownership, sale or rental
of real property, or.from the sale or use of tangible personal property,"
the tax was imposed on the proportion of their entire net profits that
equaled the proportion of their in-state property relative to their entire
property.111
The taxpayer in the case, a U.S.-based company, claimed that Con-
necticut's taxation method violated the interstate Commerce Clause
and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because Connecticut was taxing income earned outside the state.1 12
The Court rejected the Commerce Clause claim with litde elaboration
and ruled against the taxpayer on the Due Process claim as well. The
Court held that Connecticut was not taxing income earned outside its
jurisdiction as:
the profits of the corporation were largely earned by a series of trans-
actions beginning with manufacture in Connecticut and ending with
sale in other States.... The legislature in attempting to put upon this
business its fair share of the burden of taxation was faced with the
impossibility of allocating specifically the profits earned by the
processes conducted within its borders. It, therefore, adopted a
method of apportionment which ... was meant to reach.., only the
profits earned within the State. 113
Thus, in its first foray into the area of state formula-apportionment
taxation, the Court upheld the state's tax.
In the next case in this area, Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State
Tax Commission,114 the Court faced a formula- apportionment method
of taxation applied to a foreign-based business. The petitioner in Bass
was a British brewery that imported beer into the United States
through the cities of New York and Chicago.' 5 At issue in the case was
New York's method of taxing foreign corporations conducting busi-
ness in the state. Foreign businesses conducting business both inside
and outside New York were taxed on that portion of their net income
which equaled "the proportion which the aggregate value of specified
classes of the assets of the corporation within the State bears to the
aggregate value of all such classes of assets wherever located.""16
The British taxpayer claimed that the New York tax violated the
Due Process and foreign Commerce Clauses as it taxed income earned
outside the United States. 1 7 The Court noted that Underwood con-
110 Id.
"I Id. at 118.
112 Id. at 119-20.
113 Id. at 120-21.
114 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
115 Id. at 278-79.
116 Id. at 278.
117 Id. at 280.
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trolled; as a result the taxpayer's claim failed.1 18 The opinion stated
that:
[A]s the Company carried on the unitary business of manufacturing
and selling ale, in which its profits were earned by a series of transac-
tions beginning... in England and ending in sales in New York . . .
the state was justified in attributing to New York a just proportion of
the profits earned by the Company from such unitary business.
1 1 9
Before concluding, the Court turned to the taxpayer's argument
that it should not be taxed by New York since it posted no net profits
within the state for the tax years in question. This argument was re-
jected on the grounds that merely because a corporation "did not hap-
pen to... [make] any profit" within a state did not mean it should not
be taxed; the Court indicated that as long as the corporation "de-
rive [d] a benefit" from its New York operations it could legitimately be
taxed by that state. 120
In Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina1 21 the Supreme Court finally
struck down a state's formula-apportionment method of taxation.' 22
Hans Rees' addressed North Carolina's one-factor formula-apportion-
ment method of taxation. In that case, a New York corporation con-
ducted manufacturing operations in North Carolina.1 23 Forty percent
of its output was then shipped to a warehouse in New York for ship-
ment to customers, while sixty percent of the output was shipped, on
directions from New York, directly from North Carolina to customers
across the country. 124
In this case, North Carolina taxed that proportion of a corpora-
tion's income that equaled the proportion of property owned by the
118 Id. at 280-81. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Underwood decision.
119 Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271, 282 (1924).
120 Id. at 284. At first reading this statement appears to make little sense. If a corpora-
tion earned no income within a state, that state could not impose an income tax on that
corporation. However, the Court appears to be saying in this instance that Bass did in fact
earn income from its New York operations; it contributed to the success and profitability of
the overall unitary business. Thus, the fact that no accounting profits were attributable to the
New York operations did not mean that there were in reality no profits at all attributable to
the New York operations.
121 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
122 Hans Rees' is one of the rare cases in which the Supreme Court has struck down a
state formula-apportionment method of income taxation. See Kaden, supra note 101, at 832-33
(discussing the infrequency with which courts have struck state formula-apportionment
methods of taxation). The Court has held a local ad valorem property tax on a foreign-based
instrumentality of commerce unconstitutional. See infra notes 128-42 and accompanying
text. The Court has also held that certain unitary formula-apportionment methods of in-
come taxation were unconstitutional as applied to specific taxpayers. See F.W. Woolworth Co.
v. Taxation and Revenue Dept. of N.M., 458 U.S. 354 (1982) (holding that the unitary
formula-apportionment method of taxation could not be used against a corporation engaged
in interstate commerce absent a showing that it was a "unitary business"); ASARCO, Inc. v.
Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding that the unitary taxation method
could not be used against a corporation which was not a unitary business).
123 Hans Rees, 283 U.S. at 126-27.
124 Id. at 127.
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corporation within North Carolina relative to all property owned by
the corporation. 125 Despite the similarity between Connecticut's and
North Carolina's taxation schemes, the Supreme Court struck down
the North Carolina law stating that it "unreasonably and arbitrarily...
[attributed to North Carolina] a percentage of income out of all pro-
portion to the business transacted by the [taxpayer] in the state." 126
The ruling was to be based in part on the fact that the taxpayer offered
evidence using a method of separate accounting that indicated North
Carolina's formula-apportionment method distorted the corporation's
income. 127
2. Modern Precedents
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles12 8 is one of the modern
landmark decisions in the area of state taxation and foreign com-
merce. The appellant/taxpayers in that case were six Japanese corpo-
rations engaged in the international cargo shipping business. 129 They
were dependent on using cargo containers for conducting their ship-
ping operations.1 3 0 These containers were subject to property tax in
Japan. 131
Unfortunately for the appellants, the containers were also subject
to tax by California despite the fact that a container's average annual
stay in the state was only three weeks. 132 The state taxed property pres-
ent within its jurisdiction on March 1 of any year; some of the taxpay-
ers' containers were located within the state on that date. 133 The
taxpayers contested the tax on Commerce Clause grounds.
California argued that under the four requirements set out by
Complete Auto13 4 for interstate Commerce Clause analysis, the tax
should be upheld. 135 The Court did not directly rule on the state's
claim but instead set forth a new standard for reviewing alleged bur-
dens on foreign commerce. When analyzing alleged obstacles to this
type of commerce, the Court stated that, in addition to the Complete
Auto requirements, "a court must also inquire, first, whether the tax,
notwithstanding apportionment, creates a substantial risk of interna-
tional multiple taxation, and, second, whether the tax prevents the
Federal Government from 'speaking with one voice when regulating
125 Id. at 128.
126 Id. at 135.
127 Id. at 134-35.
128 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
129 Id. at 436.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 437.
133 Id.
134 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
135 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 445 (1979).
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commercial relations with foreign governments.' "136
Under this standard the Court ruled that California's property tax
as applied to the foreign-based appellants failed. The California tax
was found to violate the first prong of the test because Japan had the
"right and the power to tax the containers in full."' 37 Thus, any tax
California placed on the containers would not only create a risk of
multiple taxation, but would in fact produce multiple taxation.13 8
The tax also was found to violate the second prong of the test. On
this issue the Court pointed to the Customs Convention on Contain-
ers, an international agreement signed by both the United States and
Japan.139 This Convention directly addressed the temporary importa-
tion of containers into the two nations. 140 It specifically exempted
such containers from "all duties and taxes whatsoever chargeable by
reason of importation."1 4 1 California's tax, stated the Court, would vi-
olate this rule, and thus impair federal uniformity and prevent the
United States from "speaking with one voice."' 42
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes143 followed quickly on the
heels of Japan Line, Ltd. It addressed the legality of certain aspects of a
Vermont income tax as applied to a corporate taxpayer. Vermont im-
posed an annual income tax on corporations doing business within its
borders. 144 The income of the corporation was computed by using a
three-factor apportionment formula similar to California's. 145
The taxpayer in the case, Mobil Oil Corporation-a New York cor-
poration doing business in Vermont-engaged in "integrated petro-
leum business" and had a substantial number of subsidiaries and
affiliates abroad that engaged in similar operations.1 46 During the tax
years at issue in the case, Mobil received a substantial amount of divi-
dend income from those subsidiaries operating abroad. 147 In calculat-
ing Mobil's taxable income, Vermont included the dividends received
from the subsidiaries. 148 Mobil challenged the tax as a violation of the
136 Id. at 451.
137 Id. at 451-52.
138 Id.
139 Id. (citing Customs Convention on Containers, art. 2, May 18, 1956, [1969], 20 U.S.T.
301, 304, T.I.A.S. No. 6634).
140 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 452-53 (1979).
141 Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
142 Id.
143 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
144 Id. at 429.
145 Id. The formula was calculated by multiplying corporate income by a fraction; the
numerator consisted of the sum of the corporation's Vermont payroll, property values, and
sales, while the denominator was three. Id. Vermont's tax was different from California's in
that Vermont only required a corporation to report its income on its tax returns; a corpora-
tion's subsidiaries and affiliates did not have to have their income directly reported on the
corporation's tax return. See id.
146 Id. at 428.
147 Id. at 430.
148 Id. at 431.
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Due Process and Commerce Clauses. 149
I The Court first confronted the taxpayer's Due Process claim. The
Court began its examination of the problem by stating that the Due
Process Clause only imposed two requirements on state taxes levied on
businesses engaged in commercial activities outside of the state: (1) "a
minimal connection between the interstate activities [of the business]
and the state";150 and (2) "a rational relationship between the income
attributed to the state and the intrastate values of the enterprise." 15 1
Mobil argued that the Vermont tax failed under this test because the
state could not tax income with a "foreign source" (i.e., the dividends
received from the corporations operating abroad) and because divi-
dends earned from affiliates and subsidiaries simply could not be
taxed.' 5 2
The Court rejected the taxpayer's first argument by concluding
that there was an adequate connection between the corporation's in-
state and foreign activities since the corporation's "foreign activites
[were] part of [Mobil's] integrated petroleum enterprise."15 3 The
Court then faced Mobil's second argument. In support of its conten-
tion that dividends from its subsidiairies and affiliates should not be
included as part of its Vermont taxable income, Mobil argued that the
activities of its holding company, in which capacity it received the divi-
dend income, were a separate business from its petroleum enter-
prise.154  Nevertheless, the Court found Mobil's argument
unpersuasive and held that as "long as dividends.., from subsidiaries
... reflect[ ] profits derived from a functionally integrated enterprise,
those dividends are income to the parent company.'1 5 5
The Court concluded the opinion by ruling on the taxpayer's
Commerce Clause arguments. Looking at the Complete Auto require-
ments,' 5 6 the Court found that the Vermont tax did not violate the
interstate Commerce Clause. However, Mobil argued that, under the
foreign Commerce Clause, Vermont could not apportion any of the
"foreign source" dividend income to Mobil's in-state operations. 157
Mobil believed that Vermont's method of taxing such income simply
created too great a risk of imposing multiple taxation on "foreign
source income. " 5 8
To prevent this problem, Mobil proposed that "foreign source"
dividend income be taxed only at a corporation's place of incorpora-
149 Id. at 432.
150 Id. at 436-37.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 437-38.
153 Id. at 439-40.
154 Id. at 440.
155 Id.
156 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
157 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 446 (1980).
158 Id.
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tion (i.e., New York). 159 The Court did not accept the argument and
ruled that the Vermont tax did not violate the foreign Commerce
Clause. 160 The Court found further support for this position by noting
that Congress had refused to prohibit state taxes on "foreign source"
dividend income. 161
The next important case in the area of foreign commerce and
state taxation was Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board.162 In
Container Corp. the question arose whether California's WWCR method
was constitutional as applied to a domestic-based unitary business with
foreign subsidiaries. 163 By a five to three vote, the Court upheld Cali-
fornia's tax. 164
At the outset, the Court discussed the "fairness" of the tax. If the
tax was not fair then it would not survive Due Process or Commerce
Clause scrutiny. 165 The taxpayer argued that WWCR taxation, unlike
AL/SA taxation, ignored the fact that its foreign subsidiaries were sig-
nificantly more profitable than its domestic subsidiaries and thus un-
fairly taxed foreign income. 166 The Court responded to that argument
by pointing out that WWCR taxation, unlike AL/SA taxation, did not
ignore the income generated by "functional integration, centralization
of management, and economies of scale." This feat would support the
Tax Board's contention that the California operations were contribut-
ing to the profits earned by the foreign subsidiaries and should be
taxed. 167 The Court, after addressing a similar argument related to
the differences in payroll in domestic and foreign operations, con-
cluded that WWCR taxation was fair.16 8
Next the majority confronted the two Japan Line factors which are
specific to foreign Commerce Clause analysis.169 The majority con-
ceded that in this case, WWCR taxation, like the tax in Japan Line, had
resulted in double taxation.' 70 Nevertheless, the opinion was able to
distinguish WWCR taxation from the property tax struck down in Japan
Line. First, the tax in Container Corp. was on income rather than prop-
erty. 171 Second, the double taxation here was not the inevitable result
of WWCR taxation; instead, it resulted from the fact that most foreign
159 Id.
160 Id. at 449.
161 Id. at 448-49.
162 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
163 Id. at 163.
164 Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision, andJustice Powell wrote a dissent-
ing opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor joined. Id. at 197 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 169.
166 Id. at 181.
167 Id. (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 438 (1980)).
168 Id. at 184.
169 See supra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
170 Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 169, 187 (1983).
171 Id. at 188.
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jurisdictions used AL/SA taxation schemes. Even if California
switched to that scheme, double taxation might still result. 172 Finally,
the tax at issue fell on a domestic parent, whereas the tax in Japan Line
fell on the "foreign owners of an instrumentality of foreign
commerce."
173
The majority concluded their opinion by ruling on the second
prong of the Japan Line test. The taxpayer's claim failed on this issue
as well. The Court found that California's tax did not implicate for-
eign policy issues which should be left to the federal government or
otherwise violate the one-voice standard. Here, the tax was imposed
on a domestic entity rather than a foreign one, the executive branch
had not indicated its opposition to the tax by filing an amicus brief,
nor were there any indications of congressional intent to ban the
tax. 174 Thus, California's WWCR tax was upheld.
The final major case prior to Barclays which implicated state taxa-
tion and foreign commerce issues was Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida
Department of Revenue.1 75 In Wardair the constitutionality of Florida's
tax on the sale of fuel to common carriers, including airlines, was ques-
tioned. The petitioner in that case was a Canadian airline who had
been taxed on fuel it had bought in Florida. 176
The Court engaged in a dormant Commerce Clause analysis to
determine the validity of the statute. The petitioner and the United
States as amicus curiae, however, limited their attack on the statute to
its validity under the second prong of the Japan Line test.1 77 The peti-
tioner argued that the statute impaired the ability of the federal gov-
ernment to speak with one voice, and supported its argument by
pointing to several international agreements.1 78 The Court rejected
this argument and in fact drew the opposite conclusion from those
same contentions: "[T] he international agreements cited demonstrate
that the Federal Government has affirmatively acted, rather than re-
mained silent, with respect to the power of the States to tax aviation
fuel, and thus the case does not call for dormant Commerce Clause
analysis at all."179
The Court in perusing the agreements noted that one of them
had never been officially "endorsed ... signed, entered into . . .or
172 Id.
173 Id. The Court did not explicitly state why it would matter whether the tax fell on
foreign, as opposed to domestic, owners. Possibly, the assumption was that foreign nations
have the right to tax the entire value of the property and income of their citizens, whereas
they could not do such to non-citizens operating within their boundaries. See supra notes
128-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Japan Line case.
174 Container Cop., 463 U.S. at 193-97.
175 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
176 Id. at 3.
177 Id. at 9-10.
178 Id.
179 Id.
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passed by the Executive or Legislative Branch of the Federal Govern-
ment."180 The Court also found that in seventy of the bilateral agree-
ments to which the United States was a party, not one of them denied
states the power to tax aviation fuel.1 81 In fact; a U.S.-Canadian agree-
ment limited the tax exemption on the sale of fuel to "national duties
and charges."18 2 The Court believed that these agreements all led to
the conclusion that the federal government had acted and thereby ac-
quiesced to the tax.183 Thus, no dormant Commerce Clause analysis
was necessary.1 84
IV. Analysis
A. Practical Ramifications of Barclays
Arguably, the sound and fury swarming around California's tax
method was much ado about nothing. After all, California had revised
its tax code in 1986 to allow corporations to choose between using the
WWCR and the "water's edge" method. 185 Moreover, only three U.S.
states still applied a mandatory unitary tax scheme method at the time
of the litigation. 186 Thus, it would appear that the debate over the
validity of California's unitary taxing scheme was largely academic.
Of course, the evidence also suggests that the decision in Barclays
was of great import. For instance, because of the Barclays holding, Cali-
fornia will not have to send out $1.5 billion in refund checks, and the
state should receive an estimated $500 million in back taxes.' 8 7 In ad-
dition, many in the international community fear the Supreme Court's
ruling will lead cash-strapped American states to adopt WWCR
taxation. 188
180 Id. at 11.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id. at 12.
184 Id. at 12-13.
185 CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 25110 (West 1992).
The " 'water's-edge' method restricts tax allocation methods to the United
States as the jurisdictional boundary .... In general [it] permits a taxpayer
corporation to exclude the income.., of foreign subsidiaries from the corpo-
ration's ... tax base. [Under § 25110] California could rely only on income
derived from permanent establishments of [the taxpayer] in the United States,
and not on income derived from wholly foreign interests, to calculate [the tax-
payer's] franchise tax.
Colgate-Palmolive v. Franchise Tax Bd., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 761, 765 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
186 Paul Laird, Walk Softly or Carry a Big Carrot, ALASKA Bus. MONTHLY, Feb. 1987, at 24,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ABD File. Those three states are Alaska, Montana, and
North Dakota. Id.
187 Adrian Croft, California Officials Hail US High Court Ruling, RxurERs, June 20, 1994,
available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, REUNA File..
188 Mark Milner & Larry Elliot, Supreme Court Risks Global Tax Battle, THE GuARMAN,June
21, 1994, at 15.
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B. Barclays' Consistency with Precedent
In some ways Barclays is fairly consistent with prior precedent. Af-
ter all, with the exception of Hans Rees, a state uni'tary income tax has
never been overturned on the grounds that it apportions income un-
fairly. In fact in Bass, the first case to reach the Court on the issue of
state unitary taxation of foreign corporations, the court upheld the tax
in question.189 Moreover, since California's WWCR tax had already
been upheld in Container Corp., 190 it would have been a blatant viola-
tion of the stare decisis principle to overturn the tax at issue in Barclays,
at least with regards to Colgate's claim.
Yet on closer inspection, it is somewhat suspect to suggest that Bar-
clays and the three most recent Supreme Court decisions preceding it
on the subject of state taxation of foreign commerce are at all logically
consistent. Take for instance the position of the Barclays court on the
WWCR method and the possibility of multiple taxation. The Barclays
Court, like the Court in Container Corp., paid little attention to the fact
that actual multiple taxation has occurred.' 9 1 According to the Court,
any such multiple taxation resulted not from California's taxation
method, but from the fact that other nations use a different method of
determining the amount of income subject to tax.' 9 2 As a factual mat-
ter this may be true, but it was also true in the case of the Japan Line.
19 3
In that case, such a consideration did not keep the Court from finding
that the tax scheme unconstitutionally placed a multiple tax on the
taxpayers. 194
Admittedly, the Court is probably right when it says that the alter-
native to WWCR taxation, the AL/SA method, would not have been
able to always avoid placing a double tax on foreign commerce. 19 5 If
different rules under which income is allocated under the AL/SA ap-
proach are used by different jurisdictions, there is a strong possibility
of double taxation. 196 Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that the
likelihood of multiple taxation, or lack thereof, has not always been a
determining factor in deciding the validity of a state taxation scheme.
For instance,,the Court chose to strike down a tax in Japan Line when it
was faced with the choice of either retaining the tax and allowing
double taxation or striking it.197 Yet, in Barclays the Court chose to
retain the tax when it had to choose between: (1) retaining the tax
189 Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924)
190 See supra notes 162-74 and accompanying text.
191 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2280 (1994).
192 Id.
193 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 452 (1979). See supra notes 128-42
and accompanying text.
194 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452.
195 Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. at 2280.
196 Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 169, 192-93 (1983).
197 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453-54.
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that had in fact caused double taxation; (2) moving to a tax that very
possibly might cause double taxation; or (3) having no tax at all. In
fact in Mobil Oil, the lack of the existence of any double taxation at all
did not prevent the. Court from determining whether the tax created
too great a risk of multiple taxation.198 Clearly, these results are not
consistent. There might be very good policy reasons to make a legiti-
mate distinction between the property tax at issue in Japan Line and
the income tax at issue in Barclays.199 Logically, however, little sepa-
rates the types of double taxation in each case.200
Barclays is also somewhat inconsistent with Wardair. In Wardair the
Court had read congressional refusal to enact treaties and laws prohib-
iting a Florida tax as congressional action.201 Having found such con-
gressional action, they refused to resort to a dormant Commerce
Clause analysis.202 The California Supreme Court in Barclays I seemed
to follow the Wardair rule exactly, and read the repeated congressional
refusal to prohibit WWCR taxation as congressional action precluding
resort to dormant Commerce Clause analysis.203 The Supreme Court's
majority opinion in Barclays took a different tack. It viewed the con-
gressional refusal to outlaw WWCR taxation as congressional action in-
dicating that WWCR taxation did not impair federal uniformity in an
area where such uniformity was necessary, not as congressional action
forbidding resort to dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 20 4 In other
words, the Court used the congressional refusal to pass laws in its dor-
mant Commerce Clause analysis, rather than as an excuse to avoid
such an analysis. Practically, there may be little difference between the
two approaches, but the decision certainly muddies the analytical wa-
ters of the Commerce Clause.
C. Possible Solutions to Problems Posed by Barclays
Barclays, while perhaps making perfect sense as a practical matter,
has created confusion in the Court's rules in the area of the foreign
Commerce Clause. After the decision it is unclear when a tax will be
deemed to have created impermissible multiple taxation. It is equally
unclear when congressional silence constitutes affirmative action pre-
cluding resort to dormant Commerce Clause analysis or merely indi-
cates that a tax will withstand dormant foreign Commerce Clause
review.
198 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 444 (1980).
199 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
200 Ironically, the Court could have avoided the double taxation question entirely in
Japan Line because it had found that the tax failed anyway under the one-voice test. Japan
Line, 441 U.S. at 452-53.
201 Wardair Can. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9 (1986).
202 Id.
203 Barclays I, supra note 37, 829 P.2d 279, 300 (Cal. 1992).
204 Id. at 2282-83.
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Perhaps the best course of action for the Court is to minimize its
analysis in this area. After all, the Court is not equipped to deal with
the delicate balancing of domestic and foreign political considerations
in the area of taxation of foreign trade. How then should it go about
exercising judicial restraint in reviewing cases brought before it under
the dormant foreign Commerce Clause? Basically, two choices seem
open to the Court: (1) eliminate dormant foreign Commerce Clause
review entirely; or (2) restrict the scope of the dormant foreign Com-
merce Clause.
One commentator, Amy Petragnani, has recently proposed the
former approach.20 5 She argues that the dormant Commerce Clause
has absolutely "no direct support in the text of the Constitution." 20 6
Instead, the Constitution grants Congress, and not the Judiciary, the
power to strike state laws interfering with Congress.2 0 7 Accordingly,
she believes that when the Court reviews state laws for their validity
under the dormant Commerce Clause, they are making policy deci-
sions that should be best left to the legislature.2 0 8
Of course, one might counter that the very purpose of the Com-
merce Clause was to prevent states from enacting discriminatory legis-
lation against either interstate or foreign commerce. Thus, it is the
role of the courts to strike down such legislation. Indeed, the histori-
cal situation at the time of the framing of the Constitution showed the
harm that resulted when states enacted their own, often discrimina-
tory, commercial regulatory laws.2 0 9 The Founding Fathers were them-
selves well aware of the need for federal rather than state control of
commercial relations between the states and with foreign nations. Al-
exander Hamilton wrote in regards to the subject of foreign commerce
that there was "no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or
finance, that more strongly demands a federal preeminence. The want
of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial trea-
ties with foreign powers."21
0
Petragnani, however, would counter that abolishing the judicially
205 See Amy M. Petragnani, The Dormant Commerce Clause: On its Last Leg, 57 ALB. L. Rev.
1215 (1994) (discussing dormant Commerce Clause review and attacking its textual validity
under the Constitution).
206 Id. at 1237.
207 Id. at 1242.
208 Id.
209 Another commentator has written about the problems confronting the young nation
prior to the adoption of the Constitution:
Another conflict simmered over trade. Only a handful of the States, New York,
Massachussets, and Pennsylvania had good harbors, and the others were depen-
dent on them for their imports-foreign and domestic, staples and luxuries.
The port states exploited their advantage mercilessly, slapping heavy taxes on
goods needed by neighboring states, driving up their prices while fattening
their own treasuries .... The Congress could do nothing, for it was denied the
power to regulate commerce.
FRED BARBASH, THE FOUNDING 35 (1987).
210 THE FEDERALISr No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
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created foreign dormant Commerce Clause does not mean that the
federal government will not have power to prevent discriminatory state
regulation of commerce. Rather, it will ensure that only Congress-
the textual possessor of the power to regulate commerce-strikes such
discriminatory laws.211 Certainly, her argument carries much force.
However, there are several shortcomings with her analysis. First, while
Petragnani criticizes the judicial activist approach of dormant Com-
merce Clause analysis, she ignores the judicial activism that it would
take to abolish such a long-standing rule. Second, it is not always cer-
tain that a popularly elected Congress would always abolish discrimina-
tory state economic legislation. Congress might not strike
discriminatory economic legislation of some politically powerful states,
while it may strike discriminatory economic laws enacted by politically
weaker states. Thus, abolishing the dormant Commerce Clause might
not create any more certainty or predictability in determining what
state laws will be upheld under the Commerce Clause.
Instead of using the approach advocated by Petragnani, the Court
should try to simply confine the scope of its dormant Commerce
Clause analysis. Justice Scalia's concurrence in Barclays offers a respon-
sible choice for the Court. The Court should only strike a state tax on
foreign commerce when it facially discriminates against foreign com-
merce or when it is indistinguishable from a law the Court has previ-
ously declared unconstitutional.21 2 These rules would offer clear
judicial guidance. They would also enable the business community to
ascertain when a law will be upheld, thus assisting them in planning
their operations to conform to the law.
In addition to the need for better judicial responses to state laws
dealing with state taxation, Congress should legislate in this area in
view of the high international stakes involved. Either it should defini-
tively state that WWCR taxation is acceptable, or it should require that
states use an AL/SA method like many other nations. It is important
not that Congress mandate one system above another, but that Con-
gress act under its Commerce Clause powers so as to keep the courts
from making rules in the volatile area of international commerce.
V. Conclusion
Barclays and other recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate
an admirable restraint in refusing to overturn state taxation schemes
which impact foreign commerce. Unfortunately, the reasoning used
to reach such results is not so laudable. The Court still purports, at
least at times, to use the dormant Commerce Clause to analyze state
211 Petragnani, supra note 205, at 1242.
212 See Barclays, supra note 1, 114 S. Ct. 2268, 2287 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(describing the two situations in which the Court would enforce a self-executing Commerce
Clause).
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legislation dealing with foreign commerce. Still more troublesome are
the inconsistent standards the Court uses in reviewing state taxation
schemes and the inconsistent application of these standards to state
taxation methods. .4
In the absence of affirmative congressional action, the best option
for the Court is to exercise judicial restraint in its legal reasoning and
to refuse to overturn state taxation methods which impact foreign
commerce, with the possible exception of a state tax which facially dis-
criminates against foreign commerce. Regardless of the actions of the
judicial branch, Congress, as a policy matter, should exercise its ple-
nary Commerce Clause power to ensure greater uniformity in state in-
come taxation methods impacting foreign commerce.
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